‘Juliet’, ‘roses’, ‘yakamoz’ and other deceptions. THEO AINLEY considers the influence of language on thought

”WHAT’S IN a name? That which we call a rose/By any other name would smell as sweet” said Juliet about Romeo (Shakespeare, 2004, originally 1597).

Underpinning this cry from the heart is the seductive idea that despite all the atrocious rumours and warnings Juliet may have heard about the Montague family, she still sees Romeo in his true form and is able to cast aside the negative and fallacious image her community has built around the young rival. Somehow, just like a pearl diver when harvesting pearls, Juliet dove through depths of meaning to reach a place of clarity and truth. What matters is not so much the name of a thing – the language that surrounds it  – but rather the thing itself, considered objectively. As if language was muddying waters we otherwise could plainly see with our innocent eyes and mind. Is it really possible to dive so deep as to get rid of this blurring socially determined language to finally think clearly, universally about the world?

In other words, is there such a thing as thinking without language, as thought without words? Or is Juliet wrong and ignores how language is the very medium shaping our capacity to think?

A certain tradition – stretching at least from Aristotle, through Descartes to us – would have it that we humans all share some sort of universal common-sense, that differences in judgement, taste and language are but cultural and accidental variations. This tradition argues that humanity can have ”immediate experiences” (Descartes 1999, originally 1637) which are considered truer, more reliable since nothing is here to filter them. Just like Saint Thomas (John 20:25, King James) we should only really believe what our senses can gather. However, Popper (2009) debunked this conception: the eye of a newborn is already full of biases brought about by evolution. Red is a peculiar colour for our eyes, because of how critical it was to distinguish it for our survival. In Popper’s terms, ”theory” – that is to say a form of language, even biological like DNA– pervades everything, and with it its biases. So ‘common sense’ and ‘immediate experiences’ do not appear as plausible leads to ‘think’ or ‘consider’ the world that surrounds us with absolute innocence. However, if our innocent eyes are not so innocent, is there still room for some sort of thinking preceding language however fraught with biological biases?

Do pre-linguistic babies share universal concepts?

A 2004 psychological study led by Susan Hespos and Elizabeth Spelke at Vanderbilt University showed that babies, although born in English speaking households, were paying more attention than adults to some categories their future mother tongues tended to ignore. English spatialises things by saying that something is on or in something whereas Korean expresses whether one item touches another in a tight or loose way (consider a spoon in a teacup as opposed to the corkscrew of a bottle). This study demonstrated that English babies pay attention to the relation favoured by Korean semantics which is completely overlooked by English adult speakers. As the title claims to have found “conceptual precursors to language”, they promote the idea of a form of ‘thought’ as in spatial and relational awareness towards objects which does not entail the necessary use of language. However, such cognitions seem too weak to uphold the standards most researchers apply to ”thought” as in conscious thinking manipulating concepts and their meaning, culturally shaped. As such this study is not enough evidence to say whether or not thoughts are independent from language.

The so-called Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis has famously attempted to answer this question by positing that the language of a speaker will influence the individual’s perceptions and cognitions. Many experiments and studies have stemmed from it, not only to assess or challenge its validity but also to understand if language determines thoughts or if thoughts are more subtly tilted by the structures of an individual’s language (strong versus weak hypothesis). Whorf himself did not produce very solid evidence. According to Steiner (1975), “[t]he metalinguistics of Whorf have for some time been under severe attack by both linguists and ethnographers. It looks as if a good deal of his work cannot be verified” (p.89).

Linguistic influences on colour perception

It has been most famously challenged by Rosch Heider (1972) who found that Dani people (who only have arguably two to five words for colour classification) can still isolate colours just as well as English speakers who do have words conceptualising eight main ones. Rosch claimed that colours were universal, and that language did not impact human perception and how we think about colour. However, this study has been challenged in turn by several others, such as Roberson et al (2000), who pointed at shortfalls in Rosch’s work and demonstrated that speakers of a language with a given colour boundary – e.g. ‘green’/’blue’ for English vs ‘wor’ (some green) / ‘nol’ (green, blue and blue/purple ) in Berinmo – are better at remembering items that correspond to their linguistic boundary. Speakers of a language without the same ‘prism’ are less likely to remember items corresponding to this foreign filter. It suggests that language does indeed influence the way humans think and perceive their world.

Yakamoz?

However, myths loom around the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis in the form of ‘untranslatable words’ that can supposedly only be really understood by ”correctly wired” native speakers. One should refrain from buying into such deceptions because “what cannot be translated can be reworded” (Robelein, 2015). Although Turkish can be said to not have a verb “to be” per se, it still manages to produce predicative sentences just as well as any other language. And although they have the word ‘yakamoz’ to refer precisely to the reflection of the moonlight on water, well, you have understood the meaning underpinning yakamoz and may well start borrowing it if you feel like it.

Of course Juliet’s claim is a beautiful cry of acceptance and open-mindedness fueled by love. But if ‘rose’ immediately musters ‘smell […] sweet’, it is because Juliet’s culture conveyed by her language tilts her towards the collocation. Humans cannot apprehend the world in a perfectly immediate fashion. Language, however fraught with cultural biases, appears as an effective way to grapple with our surroundings. The price to pay is to accept that our language structures our experience of the world and that we unconsciously have different focuses depending on the language we are using.

Inquiring into our own linguistically induced blind spots and shortcuts, crossing linguistic obstacles and building bridges might well be “what’s [truly] in a name”.

THEO AINLEY, English Language undergraduate (Erasmus), University of Chester (UK)

References

Descartes, R. (1999). Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy (4th Ed.). Hackett Publishing Company.

Popper, K. R. (2009). La connaissance objective: Une approche évolutionniste (French Edition). Flammarion.

Robelin, J. (2015, 15 June). L’intraduisible.  Noesis.

Roberson, D., Davies, I., & Davidoff, J. (2000). Color categories are not universal: Replications and new evidence from a stone-age culture. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 129(3), 369–398.

Heider, E.R. (1972). Universals in color naming and memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 93(1), pp.10–20.

Shakespeare, W., (2004). Romeo and Juliet. In Mowat, B.A. & Werstine, P. (Eds.). Folger Shakespeare Library. Simon & Schuster.

Steiner, G. (1975). After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation (First Edition). Oxford University Press.

Hespos, S.J. and Spelke, E.S. (2004). Conceptual precursors to language. Nature, 430, pp. 453-456.

Gendered bridges and shades of red. JACK BEVAN considers whether language influences the way we see the world

The so-called ‘linguistic relativity’ thesis has been one of the central discussion points in linguistics. At the heart of the argument lies the question “does language effect the way we think?”. People who believe the answer to this question is “YES” are likely to believe, to a greater or lesser extent in some form of ‘linguistic determinism’. The most extreme supporters of this view are advocates of ‘strong determinism’. In simple terms this basically proposes that thought is not possible at all without language.

Two of the main figures associated with the term ‘linguistic relativity’ are Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf. According to Wolff and Holmes (2010, p. 254), “Whorf argued for …linguistic determinism, the view that language determines the basic categories of thought and that speakers of different languages think differently”. Literature around the topic often highlights certain categories of language which demonstrates how those who acquire different languages have different thought processes. Some of these domains include colour, number and spatial relations. The way we attribute colour terms to objects differs vastly between languages. For arguments sake, if I was to ask a native English speaker “how many shades of red could you name?”, they’d probably reel off around six or seven. However a Hungarian speaker would only name two – the term ‘voros’ translates to ‘blood’ and ‘piros’ means ‘fire’. From the perspective of a native English speaker, having only two distinctions of the colour red is quite strange.

Another example used to support linguistic relativity is the use of gendered nouns in certain languages. Take the word ‘bridge’. In German it is a feminine noun and in Spanish it takes a masculine form. A study by Boroditsky (2009) showed that the native speakers unconsciously describe the nouns in accordance with their grammatical gender. So German speakers shown a picture of a bridge described it as ‘beautiful’, ‘elegant’, ‘fragile’ and ‘pretty’ whilst Spanish speakers shown the same picture described it as ‘dangerous’, sturdy’ and ‘towering’. According to Boroditsky (2009) “[a]pparently even small flukes of grammar, like the seemingly arbitrary assignment of gender to a noun, can have an effect on people’s ideas of concrete objects in the world”. This is a prime example of ‘weak determinism’ as clearly the small details of the language are changing the way people are thinking. Deutscher (2010, p. 19) argues that “in order to communicate subtle thoughts…language needs much more than a list of concepts – it needs a grammar, a sophisticated system of rules for organising concepts into coherent sentences”.

There are those who argue against linguistic relativity such as Pinker (1994, p. 58-59) who points out that there is no scientific evidence to suggest that language shapes thought and the only reason why this idea used to be plausible was because scientists did not know enough about how thinking works. For us to be able to learn an additional language surely there must be a concept in our minds already on which we attach a word to?

The conclusions that I would draw from this argument is that language does influence the way we think to some extent. I am most definitely sitting on the fence for this one as I believe there is strong enough evidence against the idea of language and thought being so closely related. I would align myself more towards the notion of ‘weak determinism’ which suggests that language may have some sort of influence on thought but does influence it wholly.

JACK BEVAN, English Language undergraduate, University of Chester, UK

 

References

Boroditsky, L. (2009). How does our language shape the way we think? Edge.

Deutscher, G. (2010). Through the language glass: Why the world looks different in other languages. London: Arrow Books.

Pinker, S. (1994). The Language instinct: The new science of language and mind. London: Penguin Books.

Wolff, P. and Holmes, K. (2010). Linguistic relativity. WIREs Cognitive Science, 2, pp. 253-265.

 

Does language clarify a kaleidoscope of concepts? TAYLOR HAMNETT discusses linguistic relativity

What if you couldn’t experience thoughts, feelings and concepts from other languages and cultures, effectively trapped in the “prison house” of your own language? It would get boring, very quickly, and well, all of us English students and our fellow linguists would be out of a job! Especially as we look outside of our language using metalanguage to analyse and describe language (pretty meta right?).  This “prison house” view of language illustrates the strongest version of the so-called Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, suggesting that our perception of the world around us is entirely determined by our language.

As you’re reading this you must be thinking this is utter nonsense! And in my opinion, you would be largely correct. This version of the hypothesis has been largely discredited and I take extreme ‘schadenfreude’ (look it up…!) in that fact. The argument that we cannot think outside of our language means that language itself would never had originated without a conceptual reason for it to develop. It means that children couldn’t learn a language as there would be no concept in the first place for them to attach a word.

As you can tell this hypothesis has caused controversy amongst linguists. The origins of the hypothesis are often credited to the linguists Edward Sapir and his student Benjamin Whorf. Whorf (1956) claimed that the world is “presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organised by our minds – and this means largely by the linguistic system in our minds.” In other words, each culture dissects nature into categories through their native language, potentially creating a kaleidoscope of different reflections of the world.

The more credible version of the hypothesis, known as linguistic relativism, is the view that language does not completely determine our thoughts but may influence it to some extent. There are fascinating studies that may provide evidence for this view.

For instance, Everett’s (2013, p. 259) study of the Amazonian Pirahã seemed to show that the tribe lacked numerals, instead using words like “many” to distinguish amount. From a western standpoint it would be impossible for society to comprehend the world around us without being able to quantify objects around us. The Pirahã tribe don’t seem to be able to quantify objects in the same way English speakers can and this may partially be down to the absence of numbers in their language.

Aside from numerals, the way colour terms are expressed in language potentially reinforces the credibility of linguistic relativism. For instance, Khamsi (2007) studied Russian and English speakers’ ability to distinguish between a spectrum of blue colours. He noted that the Russian speakers would distinguish between light blues and dark blues 10% quicker than the English speakers and theorised that this is because the Russian language has to make the distinction between light blue “goluboy” and dark blue “siniy”, with no generic word for ‘blue’ itself.

Not everybody agrees that the evidence points to linguistic relativity. One case against the Pirahã tribe study regarding number comes from McWhorter (2014: 15-16) who argues that small hunter-gatherer groups would have no need for numerals due to there being a lack of a money-based economy as well as a lack of influence from the world beyond where they reside. Other linguists like Bloom (1981: 364 – 5) fundamentally disagree with linguistic relativity, stating that language is purely “a tool for the expression and storage of ideas.”

Needless to say, even if language is purely a tool for expression, what we can express through language reflects not only ourselves but our culture and the world around us.

TAYLOR HAMNETT, English Language undergraduate, University of Chester, UK

References

Bloom, A. (1981). The linguistic shaping of thought. New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Everett, D. (2013). Language: The cultural tool. London: Profile Books Ltd.

Khamsi, R. (2007). Russian speakers get the blues. New Scientist.

Sapir, E. (1949). Selected writings of Edward Sapir in Language, culture, and personality. California: University of California Press.

Whorf, B.L. (1956). Language, thought and reality: Selected writings of Benjamin Lee Whorf. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

 

Can English speakers understand the concepts of ‘schadenfreude’ and ‘hiraeth’ without knowing these words? AMY RUTTER tries to escape the prison-house of language

Just how closely linked are language and thought? Does our own language confine our way of thinking? Are we missing out on whole aspects of life if we don’t possess the vocabulary for a concept? These are just some of the important questions related to linguistic relativity and have divided linguists for decades.

The debate is mainly split into two groups: supporters of ‘relativism’ and supporters of ‘universalism’.

Linguistic relativity is the idea that language is connected to, and perhaps influences thought. Everett (2013) suggests it is “the notion that thought patterns or cognition do vary in accordance with people’s languages”. But does this really mean that we see the world dependant on the language we are born learning?

The ‘linguistic relativity’ hypothesis is often referred to as the ‘Sapir-Whorf’ hypothesis. Edward Sapir and his former student Benjamin Whorf, both American linguists, are often attributed with the theory that language is a “straightjacket” that keeps us from fully experiencing the world (Everett, 2013). If a language does not contain a word for a concept, it is argued that these concepts cannot be understood by the speaker. An extreme or ‘strong’ version of this posits that “language determines thought”, whereas the weaker form suggests that “language influences thought” (Lund, 2003).  There is an implication that people are perhaps trapped by their language. But what about those who can speak multiple languages? Are they actively expanding their world view? Can they see the world ‘better’ than monolinguals?

The linguistic determinism hypothesis is sometimes referred to as the “prison house view of language” (Mooney & Evans, 2015). This proposes that language and thought are entirely dependent on each other and if a language lacks a word for a particular concept, you would not be able to entertain the concept. Factors such as culture and experiences influence and shape a language, which would make sense as the habitats and social interactions are completely unique to each language. Birner proposes that “it seems likely that language, thought and culture form three strands of a braid, with each one affecting the others” (1999) which I am inclined to agree with.

The opposing side of the argument is known as the universalist stance, arguing that thought is completely independent of language. Pinker suggests that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is “all wrong” (1994). Supporting linguists suggest that “language is shaped by universals of human cognition” (Reiger, Kay, Gilbert & Irvy, 2007). Some linguists claim that language does not affect how people perceive things and it is simply a way of expressing thought (Bloom & Keil, 2001). To oppose the idea that people cannot comprehend a concept if they possess no word for it, a popular example given is the German word ‘schadenfreude’. It expresses the concept of finding pleasure in another person’s misfortune. Although the English language doesn’t have its own word for this concept, we still know what the concept is even if we have to use more words to express it. Therefore we cannot see the world differently from those who have more specific vocabulary, as we know what it means and understand the concept without it.

So….. are language and thought connected? I believe that it is difficult to make a strong case for this. It would be fascinating if each language viewed the world in a different way. But at the end of the day, the world looks the same no matter what language you speak. The vocabulary that a language has does not limit anyone from understanding concepts. It is possible that some languages may understand concepts more easily as they have the vocabulary and experience in their culture. But this doesn’t stop other languages from learning and taking on this vocabulary or expressing it in their own language.

From learning Welsh, Spanish and French it is always interesting to learn that they have words for concepts that I have already in English. In the Welsh language, the word ‘hiraeth’ expresses the longing for home, or missing something. The English language doesn’t have this word and yet I am still able to feel homesick. I am not limited in how I see the world because I cannot sum up the concept in a singular word.

Do you believe language and thought are connected? Does your language constrain your world view? I would love to hear how your experience and language have influenced your stance on the debate.

AMY RUTTER, English Language undergraduate, University of Chester, UK

References

Birner, B. (1999). Does the language I speak influence the way I think? Linguistic Society of America.

Bloom, P. & Keil, F. C. (2001). Thinking through language. Mind & Language, 16(4), 351-367.

Everett, C. (2013). Linguistic relativity: Evidence across languages and cognitive domains. Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter.

Lund, N. (2003). Language and Thought. (1^st ed.). London, United Kingdom: New York: Routledge.

Mooney, A., & Evans, B. (2015). Language, society and power: An introduction (4^th ed.). London: Routledge.

Regier, T., Kay, P., Gilbert, A., & Irvy, R. (2007). Language and thought: Which side are you on, anyway? In B. Malt., & W. Wolff (Eds.). Words and the mind: How words capture human experience (pp. 165-182). New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

I speak therefore I am… CONNOR McMULLEN considers whether language and thought are Big Brother or no big bother

Within his iconic novel, 1984, George Orwell presents a terrifying vision of a dystopian future, whereby a tyrannical, totalitarian regime is vying for total dominance and control over their subjects. One way in which they seek to do this is through thought control via the manipulation and eventual destruction of the English language to make way for Newspeak. Newspeak is a language that more comfortably sits in lines with the party’s visions of total obedience. A language where ideas such as democracy, liberty and freedom cannot be communicated, as there are no linguistic terms which refer to them. In this sense, the party would presumably be followers of the Sapir-Whorf hypotheses of linguistic determinism.

The fundamental idea behind linguistic determinism is that our language determines the way that we think. The theory had been pondered over since the days of Plato (Everett, 2013, p.9) before being formally introduced by Edward Sapir in 1921 (Evans & Green, 2006, p.96), then subsequently advanced by his student Benjamin Whorf (hence the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis).  Whorf’s research into Native American tribes led him to the Hopi language, a language which he would later discover has very different ways of referring to time than European languages. Whorf found that Hopi speakers have no terms or expressions for the English concept of time, and also do not have tense markers for their verbs. He concluded that, as a result of this, the Hopi speakers would have a largely different concept of time to English speakers (Whitney, 1998, p.119). A similar concept is explored within the 2016 film: Arrival, on a much larger scale and with aliens. I won’t ruin it here but it’s well worth a watch!

The suggestion that language and thought are connected in such a way gained much support for a time, and not only from linguists. Even Einstein was quoted as saying: “the mental development of the individual, and his way of forming concepts, depend to a high degree upon language” (1998, p.116; cited by Whitney). It is not just the concept of time that has shown evidence of change over different languages. Many studies over the years have provided evidence for linguistic distinctions of direction (Guugu Yimitihr & Tzetal), numbers (Chinese derived languages & Piraha), colours (Greek & Russian) and gender (German & Spanish) which determine the way the speaker views these concepts (see Evans & Green, 2006; Jackendoff, 2012; Whitney, 1998).

The argument for linguistic determinism does however come into direct conflict with another one of linguistics’ most prominent theories – that of ‘universal grammar’ (mentalese). Berlin and Kays’ 1969 publication, Basic Color Terms, used evidence of universal grammar, through the remarkably similar cross linguistic consistencies for colour terms, to counter notions of linguistic determinism (Evans, 2014, p.199). Berlin and Kays’ work has since been largely critiqued (Evans, 2014, p.204-206), however it did mark the start of what would be a minor onslaught for the Whorfian theory. For instance, psychologist Steven Pinker has since strongly pushed for the existence of mentalese over linguistic determinism (Davidson, 1996, p.19). Further critics have stated that linguistic differences in space, time and numbers could be irrelevant to cognitive processes, and are instead evidence of cultural difference. In fact, Napoli and Lee-Schoenfeld (2010) argue that there is no evidence that speakers of a language that don’t have a term for, for example, ‘time’, don’t have a concept of such a notion. They use the example of the German term ‘schadenfreude’ – to take pleasure in another’s misfortune. Whilst we may not have a term for this, it is certainly not hard for us to understand the concept (2010, p.55). Furthermore, in A Users Guide to Thought and Meaning (2012) Jackendoff agrees that language, in a few select instances, can somewhat affect thought. However he repeatedly exclaims that these aren’t ‘big effects’ (p.75-77). Jackendoff suggests that larger differences in thought can be found within speakers of the same language who have, say a different political background – using the American liberal left and religious right as examples. These two groups’ differing views on morality, foreign policy and economics are “far more consequential than little things due to language” (2012, p.77).

With this in mind, jumping back to 1984, I don’t think that the party’s efforts to eliminate all unwanted thoughts would be successful. Whilst the people of Oceania would have no words to describe the freedom they seek, or the democracy they crave, I believe that they would have concepts of it within their minds and find a way to communicate that using Newspeak. That’s not to say that the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is wrong per se, just maybe a little too strong in its assumptions. A weaker version of the theory is often looked to as the ‘ideal’ medium, positing a milder connection between language and thought (Evans & Green, 2006, p.98).

CONNOR McMULLEN, English Language undergraduate, University of Chester, UK

References

Davidson, D. (1996). Seeing through language. In Preston. J (Ed.) Thought and language (pp. 15-27). Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Evans, V. (2014). The language myth: Why is language not an instinct. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.

Evans, V., & Green, M. (2006). Cognitive linguistics: An introduction. Edinburgh, United Kingdom: Edinburgh University Press.

Everett, C. (2013). Linguistic relativity: Evidence across languages and cognitive domains (vol. 25). Germany: Walter de Gruyter.

Jackendoff, R. (2012). A user’s guide to thought and meaning. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Napoli, D. J., & Lee-Schoenfeld, V. (2010). Language matters: a guide to everyday questions about language. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.

Whitney, P. (1998). The psychology of language. New York, USA: Houghton Mifflin.

 

 

Are fewer numbers and more words for snow proof of linguistic relativity? LAURA BROWN is determined to find out.

Benjamin Whorf (1897-1941) and his teacher Edward Sapir (1884-1939) are credited with what became to be known as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis – also known as linguistic relativity -which posits that language shapes the way we think (Nordquist, 2019). The consequence of this is that languages carve up the world in various ways so that their speakers will see (or conceptualise) it differently.  According to Mooney et al (2011: 32) this theory is called either “linguistic relativism or determinism”. Mooney et al suggest that linguistic determinism is a stronger view where language, as the name suggests, determines the way we think rather than just subtly influencing it. It is sometimes labelled the ‘prison house’ view of language because the limits of language would therefore limit your perception of the world. Linguistic relativism is a toned-down version in which the belief is that language can influence the way we see the world, but not completely determine it (Mooney et al, 2011: 33). It is important to point out that, according to Everett (2013: 2) neither Sapir or Whorf  ever “actually referred to their ideas on the topic as a ‘hypothesis’”.

What is the evidence for and against the linguistic relativity hypothesis? McWhorter (2012) believes that supporters of linguistic relativity have “the tendency to interpret [the evidence] as suggesting something about the human condition that” he thinks does not (p. 2).

Let’s being with counting, and the words for quantifying objects. In English, we quantify things with several different terms. First, we have numbers, which we use to count the objects. Then we have more general terms such as ‘many’ and ‘few’. We also have some terms such as ‘couple’, mainly meaning ‘two’, and ‘dozen’ (‘twelve’). The Amazonian Pirahã were studied by Daniel Everett. who realized they have a different way of quantifying objects. Everett (2013: 150) says:

“While it has previously been suggested that there are terms for ‘one’ (hói), ‘two’ (hói), and ‘many’ (baágiso), D. Everett (2005) claimed that these terms were not in fact number words, but vague expressions for ranges of quantities”.

This means that their language is incredibly different from English, and may provide evidence for linguistic relativity. Daniel Everett (2014: 165), who spent years studying the Pirahã language, claims that “[n]umerical language serves a profound role in uniting the two innate mathematical “senses” …the exact recognition of small quantities and the approximate recognition of large quantities” (Everett, 2014, p. 165).  In other words, English speakers may perceive a group of objects in precise numbers such as 13 whereas the Pirahã people perceive small and large quantities, but not precise ones since they do not have the words for them. This seems like a good argument, but people against linguistic relativity think otherwise. McWhorter argues that people such as the Pirahã have no need for specific counting (2014: . 15-16). This may not mean that they do not have the concept for quantities, but that they simply do not have words for them.

There is also the famous claim that ‘Eskimos’ have several hundred words for snow including, for instance,  “aqilokoq” for “softly falling snow” (Robson, 2013). This is often used to support linguistic relativity with the claim that folk who have more words for snow are likely to see it differently to those for whom snow is a rare phenomenon.

Pinker, however, claims that “there is no scientific evidence that languages dramatically shape their speakers’ ways of thinking” (2003: 58-9).

LAURA BROWN, English Language undergraduate, University of Chester, UK

References

Chivers, T. (2015). The Inuit don’t have 100 words for snow, so why does the myth persist? Buzzfeed.

Everett, C. (2013). Linguistic relativity: evidence across languages and cognitive domains. De Gruyter Mouton.

Everett, D. (2005). Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã. Current Anthropology, 46(4), 621– 646.

McWhorter, J. H. (2014). The language hoax: why the world looks the same in any language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mooney, A. et al. (Eds.). (2011). Language, society & power: an introduction. (3rd ed.). London & New York: Routledge.

Nordquist, R. (2019). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis linguistic theory. ThoughtCo.

Pinker, S. (2003). The language instinct. London: Penguin.

Robson, D. (2013). There really are 50 Eskimo words for snow. Washington Post.

Do we need ‘hygge’ to experience cosiness? CATHERINE TEASDALE gets comfortable with the linguistic relativity debate

Linguistic relativity is the theory that language influences thought. For instance, Everett (2013: 1) describes it as “[t]he notion that thought patterns or cognition do vary in accordance with people’s languages”. The big question is, can a concept exist without having a word for it? This hypothesis is popularly associated with two US anthropologists/linguists Edward Sapir and Benjamin Lee Whorf in the first half of the 20^th Century. They believed that “there was a connection between language and ‘worldview’, as they called it […] claiming that language was to some extent organised and structured by these worldviews” (Bloomaert 2005).

If language is ‘structured by [our] worldviews’ then is our outlook or perspective of the world  influenced by our language(s) and therefore changes the way we think about the world? In the case of the Pirahã tribe as studied by Daniel Everett (2013, p. 257) who lived with and studied the tribe for 25 years, he found that they were lacking certain categories of words like numbers and colours. This is because they have phrases that allow them to identify these rather than having a specific word for them. In the case of colours Everett identified that “[f]or example, biisai did not simply mean ‘red’. It was a phrase that meant ‘it is like blood’ – bii ‘blood’ plus is ‘animal/it’ plus ai ‘to be’ – ‘it is blood’ (more loosely rendered as ‘it is like blood’)”. Culturally, the tribe is more accustomed to hunting and survival therefore blood is something that they will experience in everyday life. Rather than coming up with a word for the colour red instead they relate it to something that exists in their ‘reality’ already, as blood is red, it makes sense for them to identify the colour to be ‘like blood’.

The other side of this debate is that language does not at all influence our thoughts or perceptions of ‘reality’. It is possible that a concept can exist without having a specific word for it. For instance, a trend in the UK at the moment is to use Scandinavian lexis to refer to certain characteristics of domestic culture. The feeling of being cosy and warm in front of the fire or sitting on the sofa with a warm brew for many of us is an ideal image during the cold winter months, however in Denmark it is always so cold outside that all year round the Danish are seeking that feeling of cosiness, so much so they have a word for it – hygge. Parkinson (2015) describes this as “[s]itting by the fire on a cold night, wearing a woolly jumper, while drinking mulled wine and stroking a dog – probably surrounded by candles. That’s definitely ‘hygge’.” Is there any need to create a word for a feeling when we already can put a phrase or sentence together that expresses this?

To understand this we need to refer again to the Pirahã tribe, who according to McWhorter, (2014, p. 15) as “an isolated hunter-gatherer culture has no need for a word for 116, or to do long division, or to speculate about the nature of zero”. Therefore is there any need for a word if it does not relate to any part of a culture or what exists in their reality. In terms of the Danish word ‘hygge’ the concept of being cosy could still exist in UK culture without having one word to summarise the feeling, as we can use a whole phrase to express the idea.

Every culture will have different experiences of the world around them therefore it makes sense that the language we use is influenced by what we witness everyday so maybe rather than languages lacking certain types of words or having specific words, instead languages are different due to the culture and possibly the habitat. The claim by Franz Boas that “Eskimos have dozens, or even hundreds, of words for snow”, (Robson, 2013) would be understandable as they experience a lot of snowfall, therefore, culturally their livelihoods will depend on these conditions, thus the need to identify the different types.

So, the question still stands –  does language influence thought or does language exist merely for the main purpose of communication? Do we need the comfort of ‘hygge’ in our lexicon to enjoy our cosy night in front of the fire?

CATHERINE TEASDALE, English Language undergraduate, University of Chester, UK

References

Bloomaert, J. (2005, October 21). Why we are as good or bad as our language? The Guardian.

Everett, C. (2013). Linguistic relativity: Evidence across languages and cognitive domains. Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter.

Everett, D. (2013). Language: The cultural tool. London: Profile Books Ltd.

McWhorter, J.H. (2014). The language hoax: Why the world looks the same in any language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Parkinson, J. (2015, October 2). Hygge: A heart-warming lesson from Denmark. BBC News.

Robson, D. (2013, January 14). There really are 50 Eskimo words for ‘snow’. Washington Post. 

To what extent can the lexis and grammar of a language ‘colour’ our perceptions of the world? BETHANY HOWARD consider the linguistic relativity hypothesis

‘Pukak’ – meaning a powdered type of snow which looks like salt! This is just one of the many different words for ‘snow’ in the language of Central Siberian Yupik (Robson, 2013). Now that you understand the concept of the word ‘pukak’, does this change the way you think about snow?

There are arguments that we think differently in different languages (Livingstone, 2014). This is called the ‘linguistic relativity’ hypothesis and sometimes as the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. This hypothesis came about when Whorf (a student of Sapir) noticed that the Native American language, Hopi, did not have any tense markers so time could not be distinguished using words (McWhorter, 2014). This contributed to the question of whether our language can influence our thoughts.

Although the idea of linguistic relativity is controversial, there is an array of evidence to support the hypothesis. A study conducted on colour perception was carried out and found that speakers of the Russian language could distinguish between light blues and dark blues ten per cent more quickly than speakers of the English Language (Khamsi, 2007). This may be because Russian does not have a single colour term for ‘blue’ like English does. Instead, Russian speakers distinguish between the colour terms ‘light blue’ (“goluboy”) and ‘dark blue’ (“siniy”) (Khamsi, 2007).  So, does this mean that Russian speakers perceive the colour ‘blue’ differently to English speakers due to the fact that they have to distinguish between ‘light blue’ and ‘dark blue’ in their language?

This can be supported by Everett’s (2013) study which found that the Pirahã language lacks words for colour and numbers. It can be argued that the absence of these words in the language effect the way that speakers of Pirahã think. Speakers of the Pirahã language do not use numbers to count. Instead they have a very simplistic numeral system comprised of the words ‘one’ ‘two’ and ‘many’ (Everett, 2013, pg. 259). This might be surprising to hear as many of the world’s languages can use numbers to define thought whilst members of the Pirahã community could not even tell you how many children or siblings they have! Members of the Pirahã tribe “do not count because they do not have number words” (Everett, 2013, pg. 256).  If you did not have a numeral system in your language, would this change the way you think?

McWhorter (2014) argues against the linguistic relativity hypothesis by stating that Everett’s (2013) case about the Pirahã language is an “interesting thing to know, but building a case for language ‘shaping thought’ is out the window” (McWhorter, 2013). McWhorter indicates that the Pirahã tribe had no reason to use numbers in their language as they are only a small hunter-gathering tribe and many small tribes similar to the Pirahã can count silently in their heads or by using their fingers (McWhorter, 2014, pg. 15). So, although there is not any evidence of numbers in the Pirahã language, it may not necessarily have an impact in terms of how they think. In fact, Everett indicates that although a mother cannot tell you how many children she has, she will “definitely know the names of all her children and she will know where they are, about their safety, health and so on” (Everett, 2013, pg. 260).

In regards to the language of Central Siberian Yupik, Chivers (2015) suggests that there are not as many different words for snow as you might think, as Yupik is agglutinative, meaning that “they construct complex words out of smaller units” (Chivers, 2015).  Chivers then further explains that “it’s not that there are a particularly large number of snow-words […], it’s that instead of saying ‘packed snow’ or ‘wet snow’, they say something like ‘packedsnow’ or ‘wetsnow’” (Chivers, 2015). The meanings of these different types of words for ‘snow’ in Central Siberian Yupik still hold the same meanings as in English. So, does this mean that speakers of Yupik actually see snow differently than an English speaker?

Personally, I do believe that language is connected to thought but the question is, to what extent are language and thought really connected?  As Bloom & Keil (2001) state “language and vision are both excellent tools for the transfer of information” (Bloom, P. & Keil, F.C., 2001: 364 – 365) so how can information be translated into thought without the use of language? What do you think?

BETHANY HOWARD, English Language undergraduate, University of Chester, UK

References

Chivers, T. (2015, April 9). The Inuit don’t have 100 words for snow, so why does the myth persist? Buzzfeed.

Bloom, P. & Keil, F.C. (2001). Thinking through language. Mind & Language 16(1), 351-367.

Everett, D. (2013). Language – the cultural tool. London: Profile Books Ltd.

Khamsi, R. (2007). Russian speakers get the blues. New Scientist.

Livingstone, J. (2014, January 29). Relatively speaking: do our words influence how we think? The Guardian.

McWhorter, J. (2014). The language hoax. New York: Oxford University Press.

Robson, D. (2013, January 24). There really are 50 Eskimo words for ‘snow’. Washington Post. 

Does language influence our colour and number perception? JAMES NORTON thinks through language and thought

The linguistic relativity hypothesis has provoked much controversy amongst linguists, and rarely does anybody sit on the fence. Everett (2013) describes the hypothesis as “the notion that thought or cognition do vary in accordance with peoples languages” meaning that speakers of different languages conceptualise and view their own worlds differently. But does thought really affect the way an individual conceptualises their world? From my understanding of the Piraha language (Everett, 2008) and the lack of recursive numerals evident, to the limited amount of basic colour terms found in the Berinmo language (Davidoff, Davies and Robertson, 1999), it seems there is much evidence to support the linguistic relativity hypothesis.

The Berinmo tribe have fascinated linguists for many years with the most prominent work emerging from Davidoff, Davies and Robertson (1999) who found that Berinmo speakers only have five basic colour terms which means Berinmo is labelled a ‘grue’ language. David, Davies and Robertson believe that speakers of languages which encode all 11 basic colour terms conceptualise colours differently to speakers who have a reduced amount of colour terms available to them in their native language. Surely an English speaker conceptualises the colours ‘green’ and ‘blue’ differently to a Berinmo speaker who cannot differentiate between these colours and names them ‘grue’?

Berlin and Kay (1969) support the Universalist theory which holds the view that colours categories are innate physiological process rather than a cultural ones. This directly opposes linguistic relativity, as the hypothesis believes that a language is heavily influenced by the cultural experiences of many generations of speakers and language categories are not in fact innate.

Berlin and Kay’s (1969) implicational scale regarding colour further challenges linguistic relativity, as they believe all languages will develop until they have encoded all 11 basic colour terms, and languages which have not yet done this, such as Chinese and Thai, are deemed as ‘evolving’. By stating this, Berlin and Kay believe that everyone in the world conceptualise colours the same, and eventually through evolution all of the world’s languages will have encoded all 11 basic colour terms.

I would strongly disagree with this implicational scale and deem it false, as Mandarin Chinese is an older language than English yet English has two more colour terms so how does the scale explain this? Could there be cultural differences leading to the encoding of more basic colour terms? Also, the research conducted by Davidoff, Davies and Robertson, (1999) found that speakers from different language conceptualise colours differently depending on their first language. Surely speakers of different language do conceptualise colours differently, and it isn’t just the fact some languages are less evolved?

The linguistic relativity debate is fuelled greatly by many languages across the world which differ with regards to the gender of nouns. German is an example of this, as there are four different categories a noun can fall into: masculine; feminine; neuter; and plural. For example ‘die abtei’ translates to ‘abbey’ in English, however as the noun is feminine in German, does that mean a German speaker conceptualises an Abbey with female connotations compared to an English speaker who has no distinction between masculine and feminine nouns?

The Piraha language has also been viewed as a strong asset in the linguistic relativity debate, as Everett found in his 2008 study that the Piraha have no mental representation for sets of large cardinal numbers. As they have no mental representation of quantities greater than one, they are extremely restricted in remembering large numbers both spatially and temporally. An English speaker would encode the quantity through numerals which could be recited from memory, however a Piraha speaker could not. Does this not imply that English speakers conceptualise number and quantity differently to Piraha speakers?

One of the most influential figures to discredit linguistic relativity is Chomsky, as the hypothesis directly challenges his theory of universal grammar. UG holds the belief that the world’s languages share the same set of innate structural rules, and the linguistic relativity hypothesis holds the view that a language is constructed from the cultural experiences of its speakers. Again I would side with the linguistic relativity hypothesis, as it is evident not only from Berinmo and Piraha but many other small indigenous languages, that not all languages follow the same structure, and languages like Piraha deviate so much from Chomsky’s proposed structural rules that it is a strong factor in disproving UG and strengthening the hypothesis that is linguistic relativity.

I will end with one question, which refers back to one of the proponents of linguistic relativity – Benjamin Lee Whorf (1956). If in the Inuit language have over 100 words for snow, does that mean that that an Inuit speaker conceptualises snow differently when compared to an English speaker who has less than half a dozen words for snow?

JAMES NORTON, English Language undergraduate, University of Chester, UK

References

Berlin, B. and Kay, P. (1969). Basic color terms. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Davidoff, J., Davies, I., & Roberson, D. (1999). Colour categories in a stone-age tribe. Nature, 398(6724), 203.

Everett, D. (2013). Language: The cultural tool. London, United Kingdom: Profile Books Ltd.

Gordon, P. (2004). Numerical cognition without words: Evidence from Amazonia. Science, 306(5695), 496-499.

Whorf, B. L. (1956): Language, Thought and Reality (ed. J. B. Carroll). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

A language without numbers? How do mothers know how many children they have? HELENA WHITEHOUSE explores linguistic relativity

Unimaginable isn’t it, mothers not knowing how many children they have? But if a language doesn’t have numbers how could one know? Ideas such as these led the American linguists Whorf and Sapir to believe that language is the “straightjacket” that keeps us from truly experiencing the world (Everett, 2013, p.255). They claimed that the way we perceive the world is based largely upon the language that we use, and the limitations it has on us. But if this is the case, does that mean the language we speak affects the way we interpret the world?

The work of Sapir and his student Whorf eventually became known as the ‘Sapir –Whorf’ hypothesis. A ‘strong’ version of this – ‘linguistic determinism’- is the idea that the way a person thinks is totally determined by the language they speak (Everett, 2013, p.255). The theory argues that if a language is missing words to describe a concept, these concepts cannot be understood by speakers. This is kind of like the idea of a horse wearing blinkers, in that their view has been restricted so they cannot see anything past them. However, most researchers disregard this extreme form.

A weaker version of this view of the relationship between language and thought is called ‘linguistic relativity’. This is the idea that both language and thought are important in perceiving the world, and that they lean on each other for support (Humboldt, 1988, p.54). Within this theory, is the idea that cultures influence languages differently (Hussein, 2012, p.642). Whorf (1956) argued that Inuit cultures have over 50 words for snow. This is because they need to know the exact type of snow that surrounds them, to make sure it is safe to hunt or sleigh. In English, there are far fewer words for snow as it mostly does not affect our daily lives. As a Brummy living in the curry capital of the UK, for me it would be more beneficial to have over 50 words to describe a Birmingham balti rather than snow!

Linguistic relativity argues that the Inuits are perceiving the snow in a different way, as they would be absorbing more details to choose the best word to describe it (Whorf, 1956, p.210). An example supporting the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis can be seen in Everett’s (2013) study. In his study of the Amazonian tribe, the Pirahã, he found there are no words for numbers in their language. Everett believes this is the case because the Pirahã have no need for numbers, as they do not live in a modern society where there is a money-based economy (2013, p.260).

Everett tried teaching Pirahã adults to count, over many months. However, at the end of these months, not one Pirahã member was able to count to ten or add one plus one (Everett, 2005, p.626). This seemed to be evidence that the people of the Pirahã tribe cannot grasp the concept of numeracy. Their lack of words for numbers is restricting how they think. Their blinkers are well and truly on.

Nevertheless, there are examples which challenge the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Everett (2013) found that there is also a lack of colour words in the Pirahã language. This lack of colour words is due to the fact that the Pirahã people do not need them. They know every piece of flora and fauna and can recognise each species of animal. They do not need these descriptive words as every object has its own name (Everett, 2013, p.256). This, however does not mean they cannot describe colours. Everett (2013) points out that any member of the Pirahã tribe can describe any colour to you, however, in maybe a phrase rather than a single word. They may, for instance, use “xahoasai” which means “it is unripe” to describe the colour ‘green’ (Everett, 2013, p.256). This shows that people can think beyond their language to create new terms. To do this there must be room for independent thought that is not being restricted by a speaker’s language.

Personally, I am undecided as to whether language restrains us. I can confidently say I cannot think of more than five different words for snow in English, so I feel I am limited there. But if I do not know I am limited, am I truly limited? Perhaps the famous quote “the limits of my language mean the limits of my world” (Wittgenstein, 1922, p.45), is accurate and there is a whole lot of life we are missing as we do not have the capacity to express it. Or perhaps we are just making it all up as we go along.

HELENA WHITEHOUSE, English Language undergraduate, University of Chester, UK

References

Everett, D. (2005). Cultural constraints on grammar and cognition in Pirahã another look at the design features of human language. Current Anthropology, 46(4), 621-646.

Everett, D. (2013). Language: The cultural tool. London, United Kingdom: Profile Books Ltd.

Humboldt, W. (1988). On language: The diversity of human language-structure and its influence on the mental development of mankind. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press.​

Hussein, B. A. S. (2012). The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis today. Theory and Practice in Language Studies, 2(3), 642-646.

Whorf, B. L. (1956). Language, thought and reality: selected writings. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Wittgenstein, L. (1921). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & Company Inc.